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Around the time that copyright emerged as an autonomous
system of rights, men of letters, philosophers and artists conceived
their reciprocal relation, and their relation with readers and
audience, as part of a common belonging. They were committed
to building what has been lately termed the public sphere of
discourse: a space of freedom and equality where they could be
truly interlocutors and share the common goal of advancing
knowledge, experiencing beauty and furthering goodness. Authors
and the public were seen as allies and even co-workers in this task.
The role of law was to secure the integrity of such a sphere.
‘‘Copyright” was the name given to this law.
One can easily label this vision as a utopia — a romantic but
unrealizable vision. Yet one cannot help observing that our world
has, in fact, been able to realize the complete opposite of such an
ideal, in the form of a perfect counter-utopia: a condition of
permanent hostility between authors and the public. Instead of a
public sphere of equals, our world has apparently assembled a
battleground where holders and would-be holders struggle to
secure, appropriate and control the biggest possible share of
‘‘rights”. From likely allies and brothers in the furtherance of truth,
authors and the public have seemingly turned into competitors and
even enemies in what have been aptly called the ‘‘copyright wars”.
The reality and necessity of an enduring rivalry between so-called
‘‘right-holders” and ‘‘users” has been by and large explained by
modern economic theories, whose purpose, as far as copyright is
concerned, seems to be limited to ensure that wars proceed in an
effective and organized way.
Abraham Drassinower’s book What’s Wrong with Copying?1
unveils a paradox in the contemporary copyright discourse. It
demonstrates that the counter-utopia in which copyright is
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currently trapped is equally as unreal as any other conceivable
utopia, and is certainly less appealing. It does so by letting
copyright speak in its own words. No particular ‘‘theory of” or
‘‘approach to” copyright is adopted, apart from a rigorous and
uncompromised intelligence of its inherent logic. To a large extent,
it is difficult to speak of What’s Wrong with Copying? a book ‘‘on”
copyright. It is, rather, an exercise in understanding, a hearing of
law’s own narrative, as operating in case law and enshrined in
fundamental doctrines and principles. In the course of this exercise,
the book unveils a hidden, largely unheard-of dimension of
copyright, which remains silent under the curtain of the dominant
discourse.
As it is frequently the case with works of thought, the most
precious legacy of Drassinower’s book rests in its ‘‘unspoken” bit.
Far from being a defect of the argument developed in the book, this
bit coincides with the limits of copyright itself. It is unspoken for
good reason. In my comment, I will try to address this bit, by
focusing on what seems to me the crux of copyright in our times, as
made flagrant precisely thanks to Drassinower’s analysis.
The question revolves around the meaning of ‘‘use” in a
copyright sense, as addressed in particular in chapter 3 of the
book.2 As logic instructs, the question of what a use of a copyright
work is precedes the question of whether such a use is fair. If there
is no use in the first place, no fair use analysis needs to be
undertaken. Curiously enough, the rich jurisprudence on fair use
and fair dealing has left the ‘‘use”-question largely implicit. Yet the
question becomes paramount in our times, as technology enables
utilizations of copyright works that, albeit entailing copying of
works on an even mass scale, do not fit squarely within our
common understanding of what a use of a copyright work is.
Recent case law on technical reproduction of copyright works in
search engines and the like illustrate this point.3
Drassinower addresses technical reproduction under the
umbrella of copying without authorship. His analysis unveils a
principle of copyright infringement, in that authorial entitlements
are invaded only when the original act of speech is superseded by an
act of the same nature — in Drassinower’s language, when the
author’s work is used as a work. This principle allows
2 Drassinower, 85-110.
3 See the discussion of Arriba Soft and its aftermaths in Drassinower, 100-103.
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differentiating between two distinct non-infringing uses, namely:
fair uses and non-uses of the work.4 While fair use is an essential
component of copyright, i.e., a constitutive element of its logic, a
‘‘non use” is purely and simply outside the copyright sphere. As
illustrated in the seminal case of Baker v. Selden5 — as masterfully
read by Drassinower — uses of a work as something else than a
communicative act (for instance, as a set of instructions to perform
a task) may be a matter of regulation under other laws (for instance
patent law), but are irrelevant from a copyright perspective.6 Such
use is lawful not because it is fair, but because it is not a use of the
work as a work. So, in principle, whenever the work is not used as
such, i.e., as an instantiation of an act of authorship, no question of
infringement can arise. Uses of works as something else than a
work — however valuable these uses may be — are outside the
scope of copyright.
In its cleanness, the ‘‘nonuse doctrine” provides a rational
account of copyright operation and enables to discern a limit of
copyright — and perhaps a limit of law as such in our times. The
doctrine is tested in Drassinower’s book by reference of some
illustrative cases, where courts have expanded the fair use analysis
to cover various instances of so-called ‘‘technological
transformative” use. In one case, a company collected essays
submitted by students for marking, and engaged in repeated acts of
reproduction for purpose of detecting plagiarism.7 Another case is
that of conversion of in-copyright books in digital format in order
to enable a search engine to crawl inside those books.8 Both cases
entail a prima facie infringement of the right to copy, and in both
cases the defendant prevailed under a fair use analysis. Drassinower
convincingly argues that situations of that kind are better addressed
as nonuse instead of fair use: ‘‘The defendant escapes liability not
because her unauthorized use is fair but because it is not a use.”9
The work is utilized in a way and for purposes that have nothing to
do with what a work in the first place is, namely as the instantiation
of a communicative act of authorship. It is not a use of the work as
4 Ibid.
5 101 U.S. 99 (1896).
6 Drassinower, 88-100.
7 AV v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 Fed. R., 3rd Series (2009).
8 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y., 2013).
9 Drassinower, 102.
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a work, but as a material support of data to be chewed by machines.
One may say: the work is used as pure raw material for algorithms.
It is utilized, but not used.
The nonuse doctrine is clearly reminiscent of trade-mark law.10
However, a patent case may perhaps be more illustrative of the
point I would like to address. It is the case of Moore v. Regents of
the University of California.11 The plaintiff in this case was a patient
of the Medical Center of the University of California at Los
Angeles who underwent a treatment for an uncommon form of
leukemia. In the course of the treatment, samples of his body fluids
and other biological material where taken, which were later
developed into a cell line that was patented and commercialized.
In its majority opinion, the Supreme Court of California dismissed
Moore’s claim of ownership over the biological material and the
products derived from it, on the ground that Moore’s contribution
to the patented invention was not the kind of ‘‘inventive effort that
patent law rewards”.12 Although valuable and even non-
substitutable, such material does not originate from an act of
inventorship. Its use may be questionable on other grounds,13 but
it is outside the scope of patent law.
Yet, use of matter emanating from the personal sphere has
become common in many areas of technology. Personal data is in
fact the currency of today’s digital economy, which is largely based
upon extracting value from information emanating from the private
sphere of individuals. Here, too, the use of personal data falls
outside the scope of the laws on privacy and data protection as
soon as the link between data and individual is broken. Use of
personal information in anonymized and aggregate forms does not,
in principle, constitute an infringement of privacy and data
protection laws, insofar as no harm is caused to individual’s
privacy and dignity.
A common thread seems to run through these examples —
plagiarism detection, mass digitization, use of genetic material and
of personal information. What all these situations have in common,
is not just the fact that they do not constitute a ‘‘use” in any legally
meaningful sense, be it copyright or patent or privacy law. They
10 See Drassinower, 109-110 (comparing copyright and trade-mark).
11 51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990).
12 Ibid., 141 (italics in the original).
13 The court admitted an action under breach of fiduciary duty (ibid. 130).
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also have in common the fact that the defendant or the user
becomes, by either operation or non-operation of law, the exclusive
user — or, otherwise put, the owner — of an instance that she has
not originated in the first place. From this perspective, the problem
is not the use as such, which can certainly be more coherently
described as a nonuse instead of a fair use. The problem is the
proprietary entitlement that the user can claim around her —
legitimate — free use.14
The issue of propertization is not new to copyright. Drassinower
discusses with marvelous acumen the founding instances of modern
copyright law, and in particular the deep implications of the famous
‘‘reversal” ofMillar v. Taylor15 in Donaldson v. Beckett.16 A careful
reading of those landmark opinions shows that Donaldson’s
‘‘reversal” is in fact an affirmation of the very principle stated by
Lord Mansfield’s judgment in Millar, namely that the entitlements
of an author to his work are those of a ‘‘proprietor” to an object of
property. In a way, the ‘‘reversal” is the foundational moment of
the long-lasting misconception of copyright as a property right over
intangibles or, as Mark Rose put it, the symbolic instant in which
‘‘possessive individualism” implants into copyright law.17 A
misconception in respect to which, as Drassinower warns, any
‘‘balancing” operation is deemed to be hopeless: ‘‘it does not follow
that the antidote to this reversal is an assertion of the public interest
over and against the interests of authorship. [. . .] What is required,
instead, is a redefinition of authorship, neither its denial nor its
limitation in the name of public interest. [. . .] The antidote to the
author as proprietor is the retrieval of the author as speaker.”18
Copyright history has seemingly repeated itself two and a half
centuries after that foundational instant. In a moment where
‘‘public interest” seems finally to prevail over copyright
maximalism, and fair use effectively mitigates the appetites of the
‘‘right-holders,” propertization — unexpectedly — rematerializes
by the back door. The much-celebrated fair use victory in A.G. v.
14 For a critical discussion on proprietary entitlements made possible by fair use
see Maurizio Borghi & Stavroula Karapapa, Copyright and Mass Digitization
(2013), 97-110.
15 (1769), 98 E.R. 201.
16 (1774), 1 E.R. 837.
17 See Mark Rose, Authors and Owners. The Invention of Copyright (1993).
18 Drassinower, 162-163 (emphasis added).
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Google may in fact be the foundational moment of a new
‘‘possessive” history: that of propertization of fair use. Finding
the antidote to the fair user as proprietor is the challenge that
What’s Wrong with Copying? leaves as a legacy for the copyright
scholars of our age.
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